Oswald Handfling, “A Situational Account of Knowledge,” 68 The Monist, 40-55 (1985).
 

D. Annis, “A Contextual Theory of Epistemic Justification,” 15 American Philosophical Quarterly (1978).
 

D. Braine, “Nature of Knowledge,” 72 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 41-63 (1971).
 

William S. Boardman, “The Relativity of Perceptual Knowledge,” 94 Synthese 145-69 (February, 1993) [submitted 12-21-90].

The paper begins by arguing for Austin's claim that perceptual knowledge must not be understood as an inference based upon sensory data. Dretske's non-inferential account of perceptual knowledge can therefore escape skeptical attack, but only if his distinction between a merely logical possibility and any "relevant" or "genuine" possibility that one be mistaken can be justified. I argue that the distinction cannot be drawn in the way Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I defend a more radical way of identifying "relevant" possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying "I know" and saying "I promise": we should, I argue, look at a claim of knowledge of some particular matter as being relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised.

 

David H. Sanford, “Proper Knowledge,” Chapter 3 of Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, 38-51 (Blackwell: 1991).
 

Stewart Cohen, “Skepticism, Relevance, and Relativity,” Chapter 2 of Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, 17-37 (Blackwell: 1991).
 

Fred Dretske, “Dretske's Replies: Knowledge: Sanford and Cohen,” in Chapter 10 of Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, 185-96 (Blackwell: 1991).
 

Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 104 The Philosophical Review 1-52 (1995).
 

David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” 74 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 549-67 (December, 1996).
 

Stephen Schiffer, “Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism,” 96 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 317-33 (1996).
 

L.T. Oakley, “A Skeptic's Reply to Lewisian Contextualism,” 31 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 309-32 (September, 2001).