[posted March 12, 1997]
G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (Macmillan: 1953).
You are all, I trust, looking at the envelope I am holding up. Everybody see it? (Affirmative murmur from class.) Fine! Now you people to my left, notice that what you see is not strictly rectangular: it is trapezoidal. If you were an artist, you would draw what you see after this manner: (he draws trapezoid whose right, vertical side is longer than its left vertical side). (Murmur of approval for artistic talent.) Yet the people to my right will notice that what they see is not rectangular either; nor is it exactly like the trapezoid which I have just drawn. Rather, what you see is like this: (he draws a mirror image of the first figure, having a taller left vertical side and a shorter right vertical side).
I suppose that no one believes that the envelope actually has either one of these trapezoidal shapes--not to mention that it has both shapes. You will no doubt assure me that the envelope is rectangular, not trapezoidal. (Murmurs of assurance.) But then it follows that what the people on my left are seeing is not the envelope; they are seeing something which has a trapezoidal shape and which only resembles (loosely) the envelope itself. Let us call what they are seeing an appearance. And, of course, for the same reasons the people on my right are seeing only appearances too.
But now the question arises whether anyone at all really sees the envelope itself as contrasted with what is merely an appearance of it. For if a person on my left were to move slowly from that side of the room to the opposite side, what he would see first will have a trapezoidal shape like the one on the board. (Points.) Then he would see something, still trapezoidal, to be sure, but more like a rectangle than what he saw the moment before. And so on until he would see something rectangular; and if he were to continue, he would see things of varying but related shapes until he finally would a trapezoidal figure "opposite to" the one he first saw. (Points to board.)
But how can we pick any one of these positions as the one in which a person sees the envelope itself and not simply another appearance? The shift in shape is gradual. Wouldn't it be arbitrary to say that at one of these positions we see the envelope itself? And anyhow, how do we know that the envelope isn't ever-so-slightly trapezoidal--due to a minor manufacturing flaw--so that the position from which we see a perfectly rectangular thing isn't the one special position anyway?
To avoid this arbitrariness, we must admit that what we see is never the envelope itself, no matter what our position, but only an appearance--which may more or less resemble the envelope itself.
[And this leads directly to our next question: why should we believe that there is an envelope involved at all? ... (Murmur expressing mild surprise at the conjuring trick which has just been performed right before--so to speak--their very eyes.)]