Yoko Nagase’s Curriculum Vitae

Office Address
Department of Economics
Lawrence University
Appleton, WI 54912-0599
Phone: 920-993-6035
Email: yoko.nagase@lawrence.edu

Education
Ph.D., Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, August 1999. Dissertation: “Acid Rain and Interregional Redistribution in a Federal System Characterized by Decentralized Leadership and Information.”

BA, International Politics, Economics, and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan, March 1993.

Teaching Experience
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, Fall 2000 – Courses: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Mathematical Economics Seminar in Topics in Mathematical Economics

Visiting Faculty Member, Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, Fall 1999 – Spring 2000. Courses: Introductory Microeconomic Theory Advanced Environmental Economics

Graduate Teaching Fellows, Department of Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, Fall 1994 – Summer 1999. Independent courses: Introductory Microeconomic Theory Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Intermediate Public Finance Discussion Sections: Introductory Microeconomic Theory Introductory Macroeconomic Theory

Papers and Publications
Yoko Nagase and Emilson C.D. Silva, “Optimal Control of Acid Rain in a Federation with Decentralized Leadership and Private Information,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 40, pp. 164-180, August, 2000

Abstract:
Acid rain is a serious transboundary pollution problem. This paper addresses the acid rain problem in the European Union. We explicitly model the EU federal system as a political hierarchy: regional (or national) governments are leaders and the central (or federal) government is a follower in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. We assume that regional power plants, the agents responsible for the emission of acidic pollutants, are privately informed about their cost functions. We model the federal problem as a multi-stage game and show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium for the game is constrained by informational asymmetry.

Research Grant

Yoko Nagase and Emilson C.D. Silva, “ Optimal Control of Acid Rain in Japan and China: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” a research project for the International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development, to be conducted from April 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001.

Abstract:
Strong evidence indicates that acid rain in Northern Kyushu and Shikoku is due to SO2 emissions from China. Beijing, Tienjin and Shanghai, major industrial cities in Northern China, have experienced large growth rates in energy consumption. Energy supplies in China come from coal-burning power plants, and China has a large reserve of one of high-sulfur coal (one of the highest sulfur content in the world). The main objective of this research project is to design an effective and efficient environmental policy to control acid rain in Japan, paying special attention to the roles played by economic incentives and institutions of both countries.

New Papers
Yoko Nagase and Emilson C.D. Silva, “Effect of Polluter Pays Principle on Control of Acid Rain.”

Abstract:
The polluter pays principle is of interest for many policy makers and environmental economist in view of efficiency as well as ethics. In the European Union, environmental regulations follows the polluter pays principle (PPP) in the sense that firms do not receive financial support in order to meet stricter environmental regulations. This essay focus on this aspect of the EU environmental policies by assuming that each power plant is liable for damages caused by its acidic pollutants. The results indicate that under the PPP, there is a possibility that even when a polluter has private information about its production technology, the policy planner may obtain the first best allocation. The results also shows that when the policy maker is unable to offer an informative price mechanism, the allocation will be the same regardless of who (the central government or the regional governments) leads the policy decision making process.

Yoko Nagase and Emilson C.D. Silva, “Interregional Transfers and Optimal Control of Acid Rain.”

Abstract:
Common observation suggests that in general local pollution damages are known only to the local government. This means that it is difficult for the central government as a policy planner to obtain accurate information about the regional environmental damages. We derive the motivation of this chapter from this viewpoint. This essay also focuses on the effect of interregional income redistribution as the benevolent central government’s policy tool. The results show that interregional income redistribution allows the central government to achieve its utilitarian objective. In particular, under informational asymmetry between the central and the local governments, interregional income redistribution plays an important role for the central government to obtain the first best allocation.

Yoko Nagase, “Income Growth in the United States: Are the Rich and the Poor Heading for Different Destinations at Different Speeds?”

Abstract:
Income mobility across generations is a center of interest in many countries. Many of us are concerned with questions such as, “Will the children of the rich be rich?” or “Is there really a vicious cycle of poverty?” A number of studies have addressed the issue of the degree to which children’s economic outcomes are affected by their parents’ wealth and my study makes three principal contributions to the existing literature. First, I update some of the results of existing studies such as Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992), and Corcoran et al (1992) by using recent data (1968-1991) extracted from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Second, I relax the assumption that the marginal effect of a parent’s earning on that of a child is identical across all income levels. Finally, I attempt to give a dynamic interpretation to the income coefficient by regarding the coefficient as an income multiplier in intergenerational income growth.

Yoko Nagase, (tentatively titled as) “Optimal Control of Acid rain: externality vs. private information,” is an extension of the above paper.

Abstract:
The motivation of this paper comes from the two aspects of the above-described model: negative externalities and private information. The existence of negative externalities across national borders drives the policy decision making towards the centralized (the federal level) environmental policy. However, the existence of private information could favor the decentralized policy making in order to achieve more efficient outcome. We explore this trade-off by changing the assumption of asymmetric information among the three types of players.

Other Professional Activities

PRESENTATIONS AT REFEREED PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

2nd ZEW Summer Workshop; Applied Environmental and Public Economics, Mannheim, Germany, June 2000 (travel cost and hotel expenditure sponsored by ZEW). Paper presented: "The Effect of the Polluter Pays Principle on Control of Acid Rain". ·

International Conference on "Economic Integration and Transformation: Structural Change, Equity, and Efficiency," Toronto, Canada, 1998. Paper presented: "Optimal Control of Acid Rain in a Federation with Decentralized Leadership and Private Information".

53rd Congress of International Institute of Public Finance, Kyoto, Japan, 1997. Paper presented: "A Political Power Game in the Control of Acid Rain".