Adam Galambos’s Curriculum Vitae

Office Address
Department of Economics
Lawrence University
Appleton, WI 54912-0599
Phone: 920-832-6667
Email: adam.galambos@lawrence.edu
Website: http://www.adamgalambos.com

 

Education
Ph.D., Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, June 2004. Dissertation: “Revealed Preference in Game Theory.”

MS, Mathematics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, August 2004.

BA, Economics, German Language, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA, May 1998.

Teaching Experience
Assistant Professor, Lawrence University, 2007- present. Courses: Microeconomic Theory, Introductory Microeconomics, Game Theory, Comparative Economic Systems, Games and Strategy in Politics (with Bill Hixon), In Pursuit of Innovation (with John Brandenberger), Freshman Studies.

Postdoctoral Fellow, Lawrence University, 2006-2007. Courses: Microeconomic Theory, Social Choice Theory, Comparative Economic Systems.

Visiting Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL, 2004 – 2006. Courses: Microeconomic Analysis

Graduate Instructor, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 1999 – 2004. Courses: Comparative Economic Systems, History of Economic Thought

Papers and Publications
Adam Galambos and Victor Reiner, “Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders,”Social Choice and Welfare, 2008(30), p. 245.

Abstract:
We describe Abello’s acyclic sets of linear orders as the per- mutations visited by commuting equivalence classes of maximal reduced decompositions. This allows us to strengthen Abello’s structural result: we show that acyclic sets arising from this construction are distributive sublat- tices of the weak Bruhat order. This, in turn, shows that Abello’s acyclic sets are, in fact, the same as Chameni-Nembua’s distributive covering sub- lattices (S.T.D.C’s). Fishburn’s alternating scheme is shown to be a special case of the Abello/Chameni-Nembua acyclic sets. Any acyclic set that arises in this way can be represented by an arrangement of pseudolines, and we use this representation to derive a simple closed form for the cardinality of the alternating scheme. The higher Bruhat orders prove to be a natural mathematical framework for this approach to the acyclic sets problem.

Adam Galambos, “Revealed Preference in Game Theory,” to be revised and resubmitted.

Abstract:
I characterize joint choice behavior generated by the pure strategy Nash equilib- rium solution concept by an extension of the Congruence Axiom of Richter(1966) to multiple agents. At the same time, I relax the “complete domain” assumption of Yanovskaya(1980) and Sprumont(2000) to “closed domain.” Without any restric- tions on the domain of the choice correspondence, determining pure strategy Nash rationalizability is computationally very complex. Specifically, it is NP–complete even if there are only two players. In contrast, the analogous problem with a single decision maker can be determined in polynomial time.

New Papers
Peter Eso and Adam Galambos, "Disagreement and Evidence Production in Pure Communication Games."

Abstract:
We expand the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of information transmission to allow for the costly provision of “hard evidence” in addition to free “soft signals” (i.e., conventional cheap talk). We prove the existence of an interval-partition equilibrium, where each cheap-talk message is sent by an interval of Sender-types, while hard signals are sent by types belonging to a finite union of intervals. We also show that the availability of costly hard signals may reverse one of the important implications of the classical cheap talk model, namely, that diverging preferences always lead to less communication.

Adam Galambos, “Implementation by General Mechanisms.”

Abstract:
In many situations (such as in writing laws) the mechanism designer may not anticipate all the actions the players might take, or may not be able to restrict the players to a certain strategy space. In such situations it is natural to consider implementation by “mechanisms” that are more general than game forms. I show that a goal correspondence is implementable by a “deviability structure” if, and only if, it is (Maskin) monotonic. I use this result to show that the “essentialness” in Danilov’s “essential monotonicity” can be viewed as a condition guaranteeing that the deviability structure implementing the goal correspondence is “equivalent” to a game form.

Other Professional Activities

PRESENTATIONS AT REFEREED PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

"Disagreement and Evidence Production in Pure Communication Games," presented at: NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference, Tulane University, 2008; Universite de Montreal, 2008; Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Kellogg School of Management, 2008.

"Revealed Preference in Game Theory," presented at: Society for Economic Dynamics 2005, Budapest, Hungary; Midwest Theory Meetings 2003, University of Pittsburgh; Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 2003, Siena, Italy.

"Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders," presented at: Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 2005, University of Caen, France.

"Implementation by General Mechanisms," presented at: European Economic Association Congress 2005, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

REFEREED FOR:

Journal of Economic Theory, International Journal of Game Theory, Economic Theory, Mathematics of Operations Research, Economic Inquiry