Adam Galambos’ Curriculum Vitae

Office Address
Department of Economics
Lawrence University
Appleton, WI 54912-0599
Phone: 920-832-6667
Email: adam.galambos@lawrence.edu
Website: http://www.lawrence.edu/fast/galamboa

 

Education
Ph.D., Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, June 2004. Dissertation: “Revealed Preference in Game Theory.”

MS, Mathematics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, August 2004.

BA, Economics, German Language, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA, May 1998.

Teaching Experience
Visiting Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL, 2004 – 2006. Courses: Microeconomic Analysis

Graduate Instructor, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 1999 – 2004. Courses: Comparative Economic Systems, History of Economic Thought

Papers and Publications
Adam Galambos and Victor Reiner, “Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders,” accepted subject to revisions at Social Choice and Welfare

Abstract:
We describe Abello’s acyclic sets of linear orders as the per- mutations visited by commuting equivalence classes of maximal reduced decompositions. This allows us to strengthen Abello’s structural result: we show that acyclic sets arising from this construction are distributive sublat- tices of the weak Bruhat order. This, in turn, shows that Abello’s acyclic sets are, in fact, the same as Chameni-Nembua’s distributive covering sub- lattices (S.T.D.C’s). Fishburn’s alternating scheme is shown to be a special case of the Abello/Chameni-Nembua acyclic sets. Any acyclic set that arises in this way can be represented by an arrangement of pseudolines, and we use this representation to derive a simple closed form for the cardinality of the alternating scheme. The higher Bruhat orders prove to be a natural mathematical framework for this approach to the acyclic sets problem.

Adam Galambos, “Revealed Preference in Game Theory,” to be revised and resubmitted.

Abstract:
I characterize joint choice behavior generated by the pure strategy Nash equilib- rium solution concept by an extension of the Congruence Axiom of Richter(1966) to multiple agents. At the same time, I relax the “complete domain” assumption of Yanovskaya(1980) and Sprumont(2000) to “closed domain.” Without any restric- tions on the domain of the choice correspondence, determining pure strategy Nash rationalizability is computationally very complex. Specifically, it is NP–complete even if there are only two players. In contrast, the analogous problem with a single decision maker can be determined in polynomial time.

New Papers
Adam Galambos, “Implementation by General Mechanisms.”

Abstract:
In many situations (such as in writing laws) the mechanism designer may not anticipate all the actions the players might take, or may not be able to restrict the players to a certain strategy space. In such situations it is natural to consider implementation by “mechanisms” that are more general than game forms. I show that a goal correspondence is implementable by a “deviability structure” if, and only if, it is (Maskin) monotonic. I use this result to show that the “essentialness” in Danilov’s “essential monotonicity” can be viewed as a condition guaranteeing that the deviability structure implementing the goal correspondence is “equivalent” to a game form.

Other Professional Activities

PRESENTATIONS AT REFEREED PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

"Revealed Preference in Game Theory," presented at: Society for Economic Dynamics 2005, Budapest, Hungary; Midwest Theory Meetings 2003, University of Pittsburgh; Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 2003, Siena, Italy.

"Acyclic Sets of Linear Orders," presented at: Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 2005, University of Caen, France.

"Implementation by General Mechanisms," presented at: European Economic Association Congress 2005, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

REFEREED FOR:

Journal of Economic Theory, International Journal of Game Theory, Economic Theory, Mathematics of Operations Research, Economic Inquiry